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Abstract 
The Treaty of Lisbon as well as its predecessor – The Draft Constitutional Treaty – has been 
widely discussed under the objectives of the Laeken Declaration, aimed at improving the 
effectiveness, transparency and democratic accountability of the EU. Although these declared 
objectives play a role in the revision of the Treaties, a hidden agenda also underlies the reform.  
In light of an enlarged, but deeply divided Union challenged by ever more pressing problems, 
the lack of institutional provisions for effective leadership seems to be of major concern to the 
member states. However, enhancing leadership in the EU is not an easy endeavor, as the 
system is highly fragmented, characterized by manifold contradictions in its institutional 
structure, and faced with strong vested interests of the member states. This paper highlights 
the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty aimed at enhancing political leadership in the 
EU. It shows that leadership is not enhanced across all institutions of the EU alike, but the 
reform clearly privileges the Councils. There capacity for jointly exercising leadership is 
enhanced through delegation of powers to third actors and the redefinition of the voting rules. 
Integration-minded member states choose for this reform in order to overcome problems of 
collective action and to contain the power of veto-players. Euro-skeptic member states are the 
potential losers of the envisaged reform. 
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1. Introduction 
The Treaty of Lisbon as well as its predecessor – The Draft Constitutional Treaty – has drawn 
considerable attention in both public debate and scientific research. Debating these treaties 
and assessing their achievements was, from the outset, framed by the Laeken declaration. This 
declaration, issued by the European Council in 2001, set the stage for a far-reaching reform of 
the European Union (EU). The central objectives of the reform, as defined by the declaration, 
are improving the effectiveness, the transparency and the democratic accountability of the EU. 
In order to underscore these objectives, a Convention was established for elaborating proposals 
for a fundamental treaty revision. As the Convention consisted primarily of Members of 
Parliament of both the national and European level, the procedure of treaty revision was 
regarded as a major step towards making European decisions more effective, more democratic, 
and more transparent (Goeler and Marhold 2003, Risse and Kleine 2007). The objectives of the 
Laeken declaration appeared to be already achieved through the well-paved way towards 
reform. 
However, this way towards reform turned out to be paved with high hurdles. The Draft 
Constitutional Treaty elaborated by the Convention was only adopted by the Council after 
initial stalemate under the Italian presidency. Eventually, it was rejected in referenda by the 
citizens of France and the Netherlands. As a consequence, the perception of the whole reform 
process and its results took on a much more critical stance (Moravcsik 2006, Crum 2008). The 
process of both elaborating of and deciding on the Treaty seemed no longer as an improvement 
of democratic accountability, but rather as a series of the usual intergovernmental bargains 
with the European Council clearly dominating the scene. Accordingly, the envisaged innovations 
did not appear to improve effectiveness, transparency and democratic accountability but, on 
the contrary, to exacerbate the complex and opaque character of the Union.  
Nevertheless, whether scholars criticize the most recent reform of the EU or whether they 
approve it as a major step into the desired direction, the criteria for assessment remain the 
same: the objectives of the Laeken declaration. Complementing but also contrasting these 
views, I argue here that, although the Laeken objectives play an important role for giving 
direction to the revision of the treaties, there was and is also a hidden agenda underlying and 
driving the reform. In light of an enlarged, but deeply divided Union challenged by pressing 
problems, the lack of effective leadership hampers European decision-making and action. This 
is of major concern to the member states, particular those who clearly aim at deepening 
integration. Although the institutional structure of the EU does not provide a clear framework 
let alone explicit positions for exerting leadership, European elites have often taken on a  3 
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leadership role in order to promote integration. Such a role has been performed either by the 
Commission and in particular its President, or by Heads of State and Government, individually 
or as a group. Commission President Delors, but also the German-French tandem, acting in 
different combinations, are examples in case. However, in a Union of 27 member states, single 
personalities or small groups of leaders have hardly the authority to give direction to the 
integration process as a whole. On the other hand, without political leadership, the process of 
European integration is doomed to stagnate, as it was often the case in the past. Therefore, if 
integration is to proceed, the EU is in need of effective leadership. 
 However, enhancing the leadership capacities of the EU is not an easy endeavor, as the Union 
is highly fragmented, characterized by manifold contradictions in its institutional structure, and 
faced with strong vested interests of the member states. Nevertheless, a series of innovations 
regarding the institutional structure of the EU and its procedures of decision-making, first 
adopted with the Draft Constitutional Treaty and then maintained in the Lisbon Treaty, are, in 
my view, clearly aimed at enhancing the leadership capacities of the EU. These innovations 
refer particularly to the intergovernmental institutions of the Union, whereas its supranational 
institutions are, if at all, only marginally improved in their capacity to lead. This gives rise to the 
following questions: first, does the reform, as laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, enhance the 
leadership capacities of the EU; second, what are the implications of the reform for the balance 
of power between the European institutions and the power relations between the member 
states; third, what are the motives underlying the choices for reform and why could this reform 
be achieved in spite of strong resistance from some member states. 
Against this background, I will highlight in the following the institutional innovations of the 
Lisbon Treaty under the hypothesis, whether and to which extent these innovations aim at 
enhancing the leadership capacities of the EU. First, I briefly sketch the leadership problem in 
the EU. Second, I give an overview on the most salient institutional and procedural reforms 
envisaged with the Lisbon Treaty. Third, I analyze to what extent and in which respect these 
reforms will improve the leadership capacities in the EU. Forth, I discuss the rationale 
underlying the reform, and how it is framed in view of the dualistic structure of the Union as a 
combination of reorganizing decision-making and delegation of powers to third actors.  Fifth, I 
give a tentative explanation why the integration-minded member states were willing to make 
these choices and why the Euro-skeptic states finally subsided to the will of the majority. 
Finally, I will draw conclusions with regard to the impact of the reform on the institutional 
structure of the EU. In particular, I claim that the power balance between the European 
institutions is slightly redressed in favor of the Councils. This however does not strengthen the 
intergovernmental dimension of the EU but it enables the Councils to act more coherently and  4 
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consistently and thus to take, to a certain extent, the lead in European integration. The price for 
this achievement is that every member state has a less influential voice in European affairs and 
that in particular the smaller and the Euro-skeptic member states are potential losers of the 
envisaged reform. 
 
2.  Political leadership in the EU 
Clear positions for exerting political leadership were not envisaged when the European 
Communities were founded.  Although the Rome Treaty did provide for the European 
Commission to play a major role as a motor of integration, this role did not enable it to take the 
lead in European affairs. The Commission’s scope of action was from the very beginning 
constrained by establishing the Council of Ministers as the institution that takes major 
decisions. But also the Council could not simply take on the leadership role. As the 
representation of the member states, it was primarily conceived as an intergovernmental body, 
serving to accommodate diverging interests and preferences of the member states. The 
continuous bargains characterizing interactions in the Council hamper it to perform as a unified 
strategic actor. Other European institutions, as the Parliament or the Court of Justice, can even 
less perform a leadership role, although they may exert significant influence on the course of 
integration. The European Parliament is not only constrained because of its limited – though 
increasing - competences, but also because of its function of an arena for deliberating on 
various political options. The European Court of Justice, as guardian of the legal order of the EU, 
is bound to observe and to interpret European law. 
In spite of this institutional constellation, political leadership was always needed for European 
integration to proceed. In the past, leadership was incidentally provided by either the 
Commission and in particular by its president or by members of the European Council, that is, 
heads of state and government. Some Commission presidents were more proactive in taking on 
a leadership role, as was in particular Jacques Delors (see e.g. Ross 1995). Others performed in 
a more reactive style, but nevertheless managed to promote European integration behind the 
scenes. The leadership role of the Commission not only lies in proposing and promoting certain 
integration projects. It is as much based on the capacity to mould these proposals according to 
the expectations and preferences of the member states und to find not the lowest, but a 
common denominator to which they all can agree. 
 Political leadership is also exerted in the intergovernmental arena of the European Union, that 
is, by the Council. In particular the German-French tandem played a major role in different  5 
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phases of European integration. This is not to say that France and Germany together leaded the 
European Community or Union according to their preferences. But as these countries often 
pursued opposing interests, resulting in different preferences and visions, they were central in 
forging a compromise for the Council as a whole. That is, the positions of these two countries 
were often representative for the whole Community or Union, and so were, in most cases, the 
compromises that the two countries forged ( Froehly 2003). More in general, the country 
holding the presidency of the Council has often played a leadership role (Tallberg 2006). 
This constellation however has dramatically changed. With successive enlargements, increasing 
the number of member states to 27 and thus more than doubling it within two decades, but 
also in face of increasingly complex challenges and unresolved problems, the positions and 
preferences of the member states become more complex, more diverse, and potential 
coalitions between them more volatile (see for the case of France and Germany: Vogel 2004).  
Accordingly, it becomes more difficult to forge compromises among member states or to 
launch proposals to which all members can easily agree. Negotiations between member states 
become also more burdensome or costly in terms of package deals or side payments. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, European elites are looking for new means to ensure progress in 
European integration. In my view, this is one of the main motives why negotiating a treaty 
reform was given highest priority. In the following section, I will examine whether this motive 
can be traced in the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
3. The substance of the Lisbon Treaty concerning the institutional 
structure of the EU 
The Lisbon Treaty, as compared to the Treaty of Nice that is actually in force in the European 
Union, envisages significant changes in the role and functioning of the major institutions of the 
EU: the Councils, the Commission and the Parliament (see CEPS et al. 2007, House of Lords 
2008). Although to different degrees, all these institutions are to be strengthened in their 
respective position through seemingly slight, but in fact far-reaching institutional and/or 
procedural innovations. However, by far the most extensive innovations refer to the working of 
the Councils.  
With regard to the Council (formerly called the Council of Ministers), the Treaty provisions aim 
at improving its capacity of decision-making by: 
  Strengthening cooperation in the office of the rotating presidency;   6 
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  Extending majority-voting to a significant number of policies (Art. 16,4 TEU); and 
  Redefining the criteria for qualified majority-voting, thus significantly lowering the 
threshold for taking binding decisions (Art. 16,4 TEU).  
Although the rotating presidency on a half year term is maintained,
1 a protocol to the Treaty 
states that three successive presidencies have to work together in close cooperation and on the 
basis of a joint working program. Majority voting is extended to new policy areas, among which 
such sensitive areas like Justice and Home Affairs. The most spectacular step in this context 
however is the fundamental redefinition of qualified majority-voting.  The system of weighted 
votes, in force since the founding of the European Communities and only altered with regard to 
the relative voting weight of the member states after successive enlargements, is completely 
abolished. Instead, the new rules provide that every state, whether large or small, has one vote 
at its disposal. 55% of the votes of the member states, but at least 15 votes (currently out of 27) 
are required for a decision to pass. In order to ensure that the larger member states cannot 
easily be outvoted, an additional criterion for qualified majority-voting is introduced. Thus, a 
positive vote has to represent at least 65 % of the population of the Union (Art. 16,4 TEU). 
 These provisions imply that decision-making in the Council is significantly facilitated, since they 
enable to outvote a larger group of member states. However, outvoting the large member 
states by a group of smaller member states is made impossible because of the population 
criterion. Thus for example France, Germany and a third large member state, let us say Italy, 
plus a small one could form a blocking minority, whereas all the 10 accession states together 
could not do so. More important however is the opposite case, that is, a positive vote, 
supported by several large states and some smaller ones, could easily pass in spite of 
opposition of a number of smaller states. For example, the large member states from the 
original “six”, that is France, Germany and Italy, plus Spain would nearly suffice to fulfil the 
population criterion; if their case would find support from 11 smaller member states – let us say 
the Benelux, Portugal, Ireland, the Baltic States plus Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia  – a positive 
decision could be reached.
2 However, contrary to the initial intentions, these rules will only 
come into force from 2014 onwards. This postponement of the application of the new voting 
system is a concession made to Poland (Dinan 2008). 
                                                           
1 The Draft Constitutional Treaty envisaged also for the Council of Ministers a longer-term presidency. Such a far-
reaching delegation of powers however was rejected by the member states. 
2 Under the regulations actually in vigor, decided with the Treaty reform of  Nice, these 15 states  together would 
represent 180 of the weighted votes; which is far less than the required 255 votes for a qualified majority.  See TEC, 
Art. 205,2.  7 
 
7 
 
With regard to the European Council, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces far-reaching innovations 
as well. It reinforces the position of the European Council as the highest body for decision-
making and directing the course of integration through:  
  Transforming the European Council into a formal body of the EU (Art. 13 TEU);  
  Attributing  to  it  the  function  of  defining  “the  general  directions  and  priorities”  of  the 
Union’s development (Art. 15 TEU); 
  Creating  the position  of  an  elected  president for  a  2  ½  years  term  (Art.  15,5  TEU);  (in 
contrast to the actual system of rotating presidencies for a period of six months).  
Although the European Council, established in the 1970ies as an informal arrangement, was for 
the first time officially mentioned in the Treaty of Maastricht, it is only with the Treaty of Lisbon 
that it is acknowledged as a formal body of the EU. As part of the institutional architecture of 
the  Union  with  far-reaching  powers  to  decide  on  the  overall  direction  of  integration,  the 
political weight of the Council, and with it the weight of the Union as a whole, is significantly 
alleviated. In addition, the position of an elected president of the European Council, who “shall 
not hold a national office” (Art. 15,6 TEU), enables the Council to exert a more pronounced 
leadership role (Blavoukos et al. 2007). Unlike the actual situation, where a Council president is 
at the same time head of state or government of a member state, the elected president can 
perform as an agenda setter and an honest broker without interference of his or her national 
interests.  Additional  regulations,  specifying  the  tasks  of  the  Council  President,  further 
contribute to strengthen his or her role as promoter of European integration and consensus-
building among the member states (Art. 15,6 TEU) (see also Blavoukos et al. 2007:239-241). 
The position of the European Parliament is improved by extending its legislative and budgetary 
powers and by giving it the right to elect the Commission president. 
The powers of Parliament are extended through: 
  Extending the procedure of co-decision, which is now labelled the “ordinary method of 
legislation”; 
  Extending its budgetary powers to the obligatory expenses of the EU;  
   Allowing it to elect the President of the Commission on a proposal of the Council (Art. 14,1 
TEU).  
Parliament has claimed, since the reform of Maastricht that introduced co-decision for a 
selected number of policy-fields and issues, to extend this procedure to all legislative decisions 
in the Union. However, member states regularly rejected these claims, making only some  8 
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concessions by piecemeal extending the range and scope of this procedure (Maurer 2005:178). 
With the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, co-decision is not only significantly extended to 
include more and in particular more sensitive policy-fields, thus further constraining national 
sovereignty. In addition, it is also now labelled as the “ordinary legislative procedure” (Art. 49 
TEU; Art. 14 and others TFEU). Some observers therefore conclude that Parliament will become 
“a full and equal co-legislator beside the Council” (Crum 2005:214).
3 Electing the president of 
the Commission has also been a longstanding claim of the Parliament. Such a step not only 
assigns an additional electoral function to the Parliament; it also significantly enhances its 
control over the Commission. 
The European Commission’s position is improved by only minor, though not unimportant steps, 
through 
  Reducing the number of Commissioners  with one third (Art. 17,5 TEU); 
  Electing its president by Parliament on a proposal of the Council (Art. 17,7 TEU) 
  Giving the Commission President the right to dismiss a single Commissioner (Art. 17,6 
TEU). 
These provisions may significantly impact on the position of the Commission. First of all, they 
might change the nature of the Commission as a collegial body of all states as they break with 
the principle that every member state is represented in the College of Commissioners. In 
practice, the Treaty provision implies that each member state participates in two out of three 
terms in the Commission while staying for one term outside. This rule however will only come 
into force in 2014. Reducing the number of Commissioners is seen in particular by small 
member states with much suspicion, as they fear to have less influence on Commission 
decisions. On the other hand, it is particularly the small member states who often favour the 
Commission as an actor, because they thus hope to contain the power of the larger member 
states in the Council.  The reduction of the number of Commissioners might improve the 
Commission’s independence from member states’ interference, which has persisted 
throughout the history of European integration in spite of clear treaty regulations banning it. 
Furthermore, a Commission president elected by Parliament implies a major change as 
compared to the actual practice. An elected president might be less responsive to the claims of 
the Council; instead, he or she could be more responsive to Parliament. This in turn may imply 
transforming the Commission into a more political body at the expense of its rather technical 
character (Hix et al. 2007). The power of the Commission President to dismiss single 
                                                           
3 This citation refers to the Constitutional Treaty but as the respective regulations were not changed, it applies to the 
Lisbon Treaty as well.  9 
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Commissioners will improve his or her position vis-à-vis the College as a whole, and thus 
enhance his or her leadership role. 
In addition to these changes regarding the individual institutions of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty 
also envisages a series of regulations affecting the institutional structure of the Union as a 
whole. Thus, the pillar-structure is abolished by transforming the Communities into the Union 
(Art. 1 TEU), although the policy fields of the second and third pillar remain differentiated 
through modes of decision-making. In particular, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) will continue to require in most cases unanimous voting (Title V, Art. 21-46 TEU). 
Furthermore, the CFSP is being improved by creating the position of a “High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs” (Art. 18 TEU).  The person in charge will hold a “double hat”, so 
that the distinction between the intergovernmental and supranational dimension of the EU is 
being blurred. On the one hand, he or she is supposed to form part of the Commission as its 
vice president (Art. 18,4 TEU); on the other, he or she will be affiliated to the Council 
Secretariat.  The High Representative will perform as the permanent chair of the Council of 
Foreign Affairs and thus offset the rotating presidency in this council (Art. 18,3 TEU);. This 
enables him or her to improve decision-making and consensus-building as well as overall policy 
continuity and coherence in this council. He or she will be supported by an “European External 
Action Service” (Art. 27,3 TEU). A further innovation refers to the role of national parliaments in 
European affairs (Art. 12 TEU and Protocol Nr. 1). They are given a more clearly defined voice in 
decision-making so that the accountability of the Union is improved and supervised also by 
national legislatures. 
Altogether, the reform of the Lisbon Treaty marks a significant step towards improving the 
position of all major institutions of the EU, although to a different degree (CEPS et al. 2007, 
House of Lords 2008). It is in particular the Councils that undergo the most far-reaching 
innovations, followed by Parliament, whereas the Commission is only subject to minor reforms. 
Interestingly, all these innovations were, for the largest part, already included in the proposals 
of the Convention (Crum 2005). That means, they survived the successive intergovernmental 
bargains, leading first to the adoption of the Draft Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon 
Treaty.  As such, they are to be regarded as the essentials of the reform that the majority of 
member states did not wish to sacrifice in face of strong opposition from some veto-players. At 
most, they accepted longer transition periods for the implementation of some of the new rules 
as well as minor temporarily exceptions in narrowly defined cases. 
 
4. The objectives underlying the reform  10 
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What are the objectives underlying the reform? First, it is clear that the innovations described 
above do respond in one or another way to the declared objectives of the Laeken Declaration. 
Efficiency in particular is improved by a series of innovations: facilitated decision-making in the 
Council, a reduced number of Commissioners, an elected resp. designated president for the 
European Council and the Council for Foreign Affairs, a High Representative for Foreign Affairs, 
and generally improved conditions for consensus-building in different decision-making bodies. 
Democratic accountability is also improved, particularly by extending the competences of 
Parliament in legislative and budgetary matters and by allowing it to elect the Commission 
President. The latter, though, gives Parliament primarily a veto power, as it is not free to choose 
a candidate. Instead, the Council continues to designate the candidate, and he or she only 
needs a vote of approval by Parliament. Furthermore, national Parliaments get a certain say in 
European affairs, an innovation, that may also slightly improve the democratic legitimacy of 
European decisions. Improving transparency is the objective that is least achieved; most 
regulations or measures meeting this objective in the original proposal of the Convention were 
later amended or abolished in the course of intergovernmental bargains on the Treaty reform. 
In addition, as a number of minor concessions to certain member states were made during this 
process, transparency was further reduced. Altogether, we see a clear hierarchy in meeting the 
Laeken objectives. Efficiency plays the most prominent role; democratic accountability is of 
minor importance and transparency is not achieved at all. As transparency is a precondition for 
holding the Union accountable, the complexity and opaqueness of some of the new regulations 
even tend to offset some of the achievements in the area of democratic accountability. 
Thus on balance, efficiency turns out to be the objective that was most successfully pursued 
and implemented with the Treaty reform. However, efficiency is a very broad and 
comprehensive objective, covering a whole spectrum of meanings. In principle, it can be 
achieved by highly diverging means. Therefore, the way in which this objective was met with 
the treaty reform hints to an underlying, more specific objective. In my view, efficiency for a 
large part stands for providing the EU with more clearly defined leadership capacities or with 
institutions that allow for exercising political leadership. Most significant in this context are the 
innovations with regard to the Councils: the strengthening of the position of the European 
Council, the establishment of longer term presidencies detached from national interests, the 
creation of the position of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs with a “double hat”, and, 
above all, the facilitation of majority voting. These innovations altogether tend to improve the 
leadership capacity of these bodies and the Union as a whole. However, these leadership 
capacities are not simply enhanced across all institutions of the EU. As we have seen, the 
reform clearly privileges the position of the Councils. Therefore we can conclude, at this point, 
that the leadership capacities of the EU are enhanced in a selective way. Why this is the case,  11 
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will be discussed in a later section. In the next section, I will first point on how leadership can be 
and is being ensured in the European Union, a political system characterized by a dualistic 
structure. 
 
 
5. Political leadership in the context of the dualistic structure of the 
European Union 
In principle, in a dualistic system as the EU, consisting of both intergovernmental bodies taking 
the most important decisions and supranational institutions that have hardly powers to take 
binding decisions, but significant resources to influence the course of European integration, 
leadership can be allocated in different ways. It can be allocated to either the Commission or 
the Council or to single member states and, also, to all of them. If we put aside this last option, 
which would simply reproduce the actual power balance in the Union, all other options have 
far-reaching impacts on the institutional structure of the EU. Allocating the leadership role to 
the Commission would imply strengthening the supranational dimension of the Union. 
Empowering a group of member states would imply transforming the EU into a hegemonic 
system, led by one or a few, most probably large, member state/s. Allocating the leadership 
role to the Council as a whole means to establish or improve a system of joint leadership. As 
the Councils have to mediate between the interests of the member states, they are not per se 
able to act as a unified actor exercising leadership (Tallberg 2006). Therefore, attributing to 
them a leadership role implies further institutional provisions. On the one hand, the leadership 
role could be improved by establishing rules that effectively contain the power of veto-players. 
On the other hand, it could be improved by delegating certain powers to third actors or 
institutions. 
When interpreting the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty against this background, it becomes 
clear that the reform neither aims at transforming the EU into a supranational organization nor 
a hegemonic system led by a few member states. Both options would by far transcend the 
actual consensus underlying European integration. Instead, member states through this reform 
clearly chose to first and foremost strengthen the leadership role of the Councils (Tallberg 
2006). Such a choice however does not simply imply strengthening the intergovernmental 
dimension of the Union. On the contrary, this dimension, resulting in problems of collective 
action, has to be contained in order to enable the Councils to perform a leadership function. 
Therefore, to fulfil such a function, institutional reforms are required that contain the weight  12 
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and dominance of intergovernmental bargains in the Councils and enhance the conditions for 
jointly taking action.   
The Lisbon Treaty clearly enacts such reforms by, first, changing the voting rules in the Council 
and, second, delegating certain powers to third actors and institutions. Changing the voting 
rules constrains the possibility of single or even larger groups of member states to hamper 
decision making and thus to act as veto-players. Under the rules of the Lisbon Treaty, 
particularly smaller member states are in fact no more able to perform such a role. Even larger 
member states are significantly constrained in acting as veto-players, as they are able to do so 
only in case that they find allies willing to support their case. With the new regulations, only 
groups of states that represent at least 35% of the population of the EU are able to block a 
decision. Conversely, a much lower number of member states, as compared to the actual 
situation, are needed for a successful decision. Thus altogether, the Council can much more 
effectively reach joint decisions and intergovernmental bargains are pushed to the background. 
Delegation of powers to third, independent actors or agents is the most preferred method, 
according to principal-agent theory and other similar approaches (Tallberg 2006), where actors 
have common interests, but are at the same time hampered in pursuing these interests 
because of strong and diverging individual interests. This is exactly the constellation 
characterizing the Council and the European Council. As the individual interests are often short-
term interests, dominating the decisions of actors, whereas the common interests are rather 
long-term, the latter are more difficult to pursue. This is even more the case, when Council 
decisions require unanimous voting or highly qualified majorities, as it is still the case under the 
Lisbon Treaty in certain policy areas. In these situations, delegation of certain powers to an 
elected president, who is able to act in the interest of the common, long term objectives, may 
help to overcome stalemate or non-decision (Tallberg 2006, Blavoukos et al. 2007). In a similar 
vein, the High representative for Foreign Affairs may act in the interest of common objectives, 
where member states are not able to do so. Therefore, the permanent presidencies of the 
Councils were particularly established for those cases where decision-making is still bound to 
unanimity, that is, the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. 
Interestingly, the extension of Parliament’s powers can also be read as a form of delegation of 
powers to a third party. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Council will have to compromise its 
position with that of the Parliament in all legislative matters.  As the Parliament in most cases 
favours European solutions above national ones or above non-decision, its increased legislative 
powers will put pressure on the Council to adopt legislation that further promotes European 
integration.  13 
 
13 
 
Altogether, both containing the veto power of a larger number of member states and 
delegating powers to seemingly neutral, but in most cases integration-minded actors clearly 
impacts on the performance of the Councils. Intergovernmental bargains are contained in 
favour of improved conditions for collective action. This in turn improves the leadership 
capacities of the EU. This form of leadership neither allows for a hegemonic position of one or a 
few member states nor does it take on a supranational form. Instead, the EU continues to be 
based on joint leadership, but this leadership is now more clearly institutionalized and more 
explicitly embedded into the intergovernmental structure of the EU’s political system.  
Delegation of powers however is not an invention of the Lisbon Treaty but has characterized 
the European Union since the foundation of the Communities. In the initial constellation, it was 
the Commission who represented and pooled all the delegated power of the EU. With the 
Lisbon Treaty, no specific additional functions, let alone an explicit leadership role, are allocated 
to the Commission, although it would best be placed to represent and pursue the common 
interest of the member states. Instead, as far as delegation occurs, it is established, first, in a 
fragmented form, since delegated powers are not concentrated in favour of one institution or 
agent but allocated to a number of actors and institutions with specific functions. Second, it is 
established under the control of the Councils, as these actors and institutions perform their 
tasks in close cooperation with or under the supervision of the Councils. This in turn means that 
the leadership functions of the EU are enhanced without however empowering actors or agents 
that tend to foster supranationalism. 
 
6. Why were member states willing to adopt this reform? 
In the foregoing section, I discussed the rationale underlying the reform of the Lisbon Treaty. 
This however does not explain why member states pushed forward or supported the reform or, 
else, did not prevent its adoption. After all, treaty revisions require unanimous decisions, so 
that vetoing the reform was a viable option.  
When discussing explanations for the reform, most scholars refer either to functional pressures 
- in particular, those emanating from Eastern enlargement – or to the official objectives set by 
the Laeken Declaration (Crum 2005, Laursen 2006). In these views, the Laeken objectives reflect 
the motives of the member states underlying the reform. Although this is the case to a certain 
extent,  member  states  also  pursued  more  specific  objectives.  In  addition,  they  obviously 
pursued contradicting options, so that the final outcome was by no means assured.  14 
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As discussed above, the most outstanding result of the reform is strengthening the Councils and 
its procedures of decision-making in order to enable it to perform a leadership role in European 
integration.
4  This implies, first,  containing the power of single or groups of member -states 
which might act as veto-players in the Council and thus hamper rapid and efficient decision -
making. It also implies, second, containing to a certain degree the role of the Commission as the 
most prominent actor in pushing forward integration. The overall objective is to pave the way 
for deepening integration, without however  taking primarily recourse to the services  of the 
Commission. Why did the member states choose for such a reform? 
In the past, the Councils were often hampered in reaching binding decisions by too many veto -
players  in  their  own  ra nks.  This  constellation  gave  the  Commission,  the  Court  and  also 
Parliament or an alliance of those institutions more room for manoeuvre to drive integration 
far beyond what  the member states intended to agree upon (Toemmel 200 8). In this way, 
member states partly lost control over European integration or they could exercise control only 
in the form of blocking further integration steps . This however meant acting against   their 
common interest. 
Therefore,  by  improving  the  Councils’  procedures  of  decision-making  and  its  capacities  of 
action,  it  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  aim  to  control  and  contain  the  expansive  logic  of  the 
Commission’s activities and other supranational actors and institutions. On the other hand, in 
light of the tremendous challenges actually facing the EU, it is the aim to maintain or improve 
momentum  in  European  integration  by  taking  the  lead  in  this  process  and  by  forging  it 
according to the interests of the member states. 
With interests of the member states in this context I do not refer to the multiplicity of interests 
characterising  the  individual  states,  but  to  their  common  interest  in  promoting  European 
integration. This interest, however, is not shared by all member states alike; on the contrary, 
there  is  -  and has,  since  the first enlargement,  always  been  -  a  marked  cleavage between 
member states which are highly integration-minded, and those which are notoriously reluctant 
in this respect. Thus, to be precise, it is primarily the integration-minded member states that 
are interested in and inclined to strengthen the Councils.
5 
                                                           
4 Surprisingly, this was the objective of Britain, France and Germany, although they pursued this aim through 
differing and even contradicting means. While Blair promoted the elected presidency, in order to ensure 
intergovernmental leadership, Germany and France promoted significantly facilitated majority voting, in order to 
strengthen leadership by outvoting veto-players. 
5 Germany on the one hand and Britain on the other do not seem to fit into this pattern (see Magnette and Nicolaidis 
2004). Germany is integration-minded, but did first and foremost demand to strengthen the Commission and 
Parliament, that is, those institutions promoting supranational developments. However, Germany was also strongly 
in favor of facilitating qualified majority voting in the Council. Britain is reluctant in European integration matters,  15 
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In significantly facilitating majority-voting, it is not so much the aim to rule out single veto-
players in decision-making, but more so a group of potential opponents to further integration 
steps. And it is the new  members of the EU which were primarily   but not exclusively   
expected to form such a group.
6 The same rationale,  that is, containing the power of veto -
players,  underlies  also  other  innovations  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  For  example,  making 
presidencies  more independent of  individual  member  states  reduces the opportunities for 
Euro-skeptic  states  to  slow  down  the  process  of  int egration.
7  Reducing  the  number  of 
Commissioners not only weakens those  member states that are temporarily not represented, 
but  it detaches  the Commission  more in general from the member states ’  influence,  thus 
containing in particular the influence of the veto-players. Giving Parliament a much larger say in 
legislation, in fact, facilitates majority-voting in the Council. Since Parliament, in its majority, is 
usually much more in favour of far-reaching integration-steps than the Council as a whole, the 
integration-minded  member  states  can  make  use  of  Parliaments  pressure  as  an  additional 
leverage to push Council decisions forward. In this vein, Parliament’s role can be seen as an 
agent promoting the common interest of the integration-minded member states.    
Why then did the Euro-skeptic member states give their consent to this move towards stronger 
Councils and other institutional innovations, since this obviously is not in their primary interest? 
I suppose they had not really an alternative, because the procedure for Treaty reform was 
designed in such a way that there was not much room for opposition or alternative options. To 
say it in other words, the methods to contain the power of veto-players, that is, the exercise of 
joint leadership and the delegation of powers to third actors were already practiced in the 
procedure to enact the reform. Thus, establishing the Convention for elaborating a Draft 
Constitutional Treaty was not simply a step towards improving the transparency and 
democratic accountability of the reform, but it implied first and foremost a delegation of 
powers to third actors, in order to prevent strong opposition to be expressed against a far-
reaching reform.
8 Once the draft Constitutional Treaty was presented by the Convention, the 
integration-minded member states unison emphasised that falling behind this position would 
seriously threaten the whole reform. In doing so, they clearly indicated the bottom line of their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
but proposed most fervently a permanent president of the Council. However, it was strongly opposed against 
facilitating majority voting in the Council. This however shows that strengthening the Councils has different aspects, 
appealing to different types of member states. 
6 Though, ironically, it seems that it are particularly the old member states who recently engage in harder bargains 
among each other, as for example has been shown by the negotiations on the financial perspective 2007-13. 
7 Thus, it was attributed to a lack in commitment of the Italian presidency that the negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty failed to be concluded by the end of 2003.  
8 As Tsebelis and Proksch (2007) claim, the Convention was not left to produce a random result. Instead, member 
states carefully directed the Convention into the desired direction by vesting it with an integration-minded 
presidency that could effectively exercise leadership and even manipulate the outcome. See also Kleine 2007.  16 
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bargaining position, but they also took on a joint political leadership role to channel the reform 
into a more narrowly defined direction. The same applies to the period after the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty failed to be ratified because of negative referenda in France and the 
Netherlands. In this situation, member states first proclaimed a reflection phase stalling the 
reform process. The reflection phase was clearly scheduled to end when Germany took over 
the presidency (Dinan 2007: 69-77). Under this presidency, and again, under the joint 
leadership of the integration-minded member states, the final deal for the Lisbon Treaty was 
surprisingly quickly concluded (See Council of the European Union 2007). However, this deal 
preceded the Intergovernmental Conference. That is, the final negotiations on all contested 
issues of the reform were held under the premise of only laying down some basic parameters 
for treaty revision (Dinan 2008, see also Koenig et al. 2008). When the Intergovernmental 
Conference was officially opened under the Portuguese presidency, only minor issues were left 
open for discussion. The Intergovernmental Conference therefore had only to finalize the text 
of the treaty and to give it the name of the capital where it was adopted. It is true that some 
concessions had to be made to some Euro-skeptic member states in the form of longer 
transition periods, exemptions in special cases and minor opt-outs. However, these concessions 
are only cosmetics as compared to the far-reaching innovations that the treaty entails.   
Altogether, the process to decide on and adopt the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty was 
already characterized by what the reform intends to accomplish: joint leadership, performed 
primarily by the Councils, that contained strong opposition of certain member states by partly 
delegating powers to certain actors other than the Commission and partly enforcing 
compliance through clearly emphasising the will of the majority.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be said that the  Lisbon Treaty envisages far-reaching innovations with 
regard to the institutional structure of the EU and its procedures of decision-making. In the first 
place, these innovations strengthen significantly the position of the Councils by attributing to 
them a clear leadership role. Such a role however can only effectively be exerted at the expense 
of containing the power of single or groups of member states. This is particularly facilitated by 
changing  the  rules  for  majority  voting  to  the  advantage  of  the  large  and  particularly  the 
integration-minded  member  states,  but  also  by  delegating  certain  powers  to  third  actors. 
Furthermore, they strengthen the Parliament seemingly at the expense of the Council, but in fact, 
by reinforcing the dynamics of European integration, in the interest of the integration-minded 
member  states  as  well.  They  slightly  change  the  position  of  the  Commission  by  both  17 
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transforming it into a smaller and more technical body and, at the same time, politicising it under 
stronger  supervision  of  the  Parliament.  In  practice,  all  these  innovations  together  imply 
strengthening the European level as a whole vis-à-vis the member states. This however does not 
mean  strengthening  the  supranational  dynamics  of  European  integration.  Nor  does  it  imply 
strengthening the intergovernmental dimension of the EU. The results of the reform are to be 
seen in a more differentiated way. The Councils are enabled to stronger promote European 
integration and thus to pursue the common interest of the member states; a role which, in the 
past, had primarily been delegated to the European Commission. As the Commission has often 
used its delegated powers to push forward integration far beyond what member states were 
willing to accept, the Council has become reluctant to further transfer powers. Pursuing itself 
the common interest of the member states however implies a high price for the Council. It 
implies,  first,  that  every  individual  state  has  less  influence  on  the  process  of  integration. 
Second, it implies that the larger and above all the integration-minded states will gain more 
influence on European integration. Third, it implies that member states that are less supportive 
to further integration will have less influence to shape this process according to their interests. 
Altogether,  it  implies  that  after  ratification  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  deepening  of  European 
integration in many policy areas and domains will no longer be based on an overall consensus 
among  member  states but  will  represent the  will  of  only  a  majority of  integration-minded 
states. Thus, shifts in the power balance of European institutions and actors do not so much 
affect the relationship between the Commission and the Council, or the intergovernmental 
versus  the  supranational  institutions,  but  they  affect  in  the  first  place  the  power  balance 
between  member  states,  those  that  actively  promote  European  integration  and  those that 
prefer to slow it down or to give it another direction. 
However, it remains to be seen how long it will take until ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is 
finally achieved, since the major opposition against the proposed reform does not rest with the 
member states, but with the citizens of Europe. Although it is often argued that their decisions 
are not based on the substance of the reform, but mostly on discontent with national politics, I 
rather  assume  that  the  citizens  rightly  perceive  that  this  reform  strengthens  European 
integration vis-à-vis national control. Furthermore, it remains to be seen to which degree the 
parties that have lost this battle will nevertheless succeed in at least delaying, if not diluting full 
implementation of the reform. And last not least, it remains to be seen whether the member 
states are able to jointly exercise leadership. The innovations of the Lisbon Treaty provide a 
framework for such an endeavour, but this implies by no means a guarantee. Divergences 
between the member states might continue to hamper collective action. To sum up in other 
words: I would wonder if the major leap forward in European integration as attempted with the 
Lisbon Treaty would not be followed by a – though probably minor - step back.  18 
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